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No antitrust statute has attracted more opprobrium than the Robin-
son-Patman amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act1 which seeks to
proscribe the practice of price discrimination. 2 A leading commentary
on the Act denounces it as "a masterpiece of obscurity"' and it is
EDITOR'S NOTE: The author is presently Senior Lecturer in Trade Practices Law at the
University of New South Wales and Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
B.A. (Hons.), LL.M. (Hons.), University of Sydney, Australia.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1976).
2. As amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat.
1526 (1936), section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination which may either
substantially lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce or which
may injure, destroy, or prevent competition with persons competing with the recipients of
a favorable discrimination or with the customers of those recipients and their com-
petitors. In other words, the statute is concerned with anti-competitive harm principally
on three distinct commercial strata: (1) competition at the level of the seller's own rivals
(primary-line competition); (2) competition at the level of the buyer's levels (secondary-line
competition); and (3) competition at the level of the buyer's customers (tertiary line or
third-line competition), although the possibility of a proscribed discrimination even beyond
these three strata was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
While the Robinson-Patman amendments were also designed to strengthen the original
Clayton Act's prohibitions of price discrimination affecting primary-line competition,
"[they] were motivated principally by congressional concern over the impact upon
secondary-line competition of the burgeoning of mammoth purchasers, notably chain
stores," FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960), and consequently aimed
"to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences
over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power," FTC v. Henry Broch &
Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960). The unamended language of section 2 of the Clayton Act
was ineffectual to prevent quantity discounts to chain stores and the ensuing purchasing
advantages because it specifically exempted price differentials made "on account of dif-
ferences in the ... quantity ... of the commodity sold." 38 Stat. 730 (1914). As a result,
significant price differences could be based on minor differences in quantity. See F. ROWE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 7 (1962 & Supp. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as ROwE].
3. The origins of the amendments of 1936 have been succinctly described:
The political impulse underlying the law was an impulse to control changes in the
channels of distribution, to curb the power of the stronger distributors, and to
enhance the opportunities of the weaker ones. It was akin to that which underlay
the NRA codes in the distributive trades, the chain store tax laws, and the state
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elsewhere criticized as being ambiguous, contradictory, jejune, and
complex.' The pro-competitive objectives of the statute are denigrated
as misconceived and unattainable.'
Notwithstanding this plethora of criticism, a number of legislatures
have emulated the United States example and introduced statutory
prohibitions of price discrimination. The most recent of these statutes
is the Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974 which contains a prohibi-
laws permitting resale price maintenance and forbidding sale below cost. It ex-
pressed, not a concern to preserve free markets, but rather a concern to assure the
survival of small business.
C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 12 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS].
4. Aside from ROWE, note 2 supra, the leading critiques of the Robinson-Patman Act
include C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (2d ed. 1959); D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, SUMMARY AND CONTENT
(1964); EDWARDS, note 2 supra; A. SAWYER. BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT (1963).
5. See R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIF-
FERENCES (1976); F. SCHERER. INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
chs. 10, 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER].
See ROWE, supra note 2, at 113-14, where the author observes:
The provisions of Section 2(a) relating to the competitive effects of challenged
prices are the key to the legality of most differential pricing practices .... These
few words present supremely complex and controversial facets of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Still vacillating are the legal interpretations as to just what degree
and type of market consequence will be deemed to constitute the proscribed
statutory effect on competition in various commercial situations. That legal uncer-
tainty is compounded by the broader philosophical clashes centering on whether the
restrictions on pricing imposed by such applications of the Robison-Patman Act
foster "hard" or "soft" competition and are compatible with over-all antitrust objec-
tives. For, to the extent the Robinson-Patman law is applied to penalize and inhibit
normal competitive price variations merely because they discomfit individual com-
petitors, the statute veers from the antitrust objective of fostering flexible com-
petitive pricing toward the contrary policy of price stabilization by law.
(citation omitted).
6. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Com.) § 49 which provides:
(1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, discriminate between pur-
chasers of goods of like grade and quality in relation to-
(a) the prices charged for the goods;
(b) any discounts, allowances, rebates or credits given in relation to the
supply of goods;
(c) the provision of services in respect of the goods; or
(d) the making of payments for services provided in respect of the goods,
if the discrimination is of such magnitude or is of such a recurring or
systematic character that it has or is likely to have the effect of substantially
lessening competition in a market for goods, being a market in which the cor-
poration supplies, or those persons supply, goods.
(2) Sub-section (1) does not apply in relation to a discrimination if-
(a) the discrimination makes only reasonable allowance for differences in the
cost or likely cost of manufacture, distribution, sale or delivery resulting
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tion of price discrimination that significantly resembles the scheme
and language of the Robinson-Patman Act. Additionally, anti-discrimi-
nation laws have been promulgated in Canada,7 The Republic of
Ireland,8 France,9 Japan,"0 and West Germany" and in the European
Economic Community 2 under both the Treaty of Rome 3 and the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community Treaty."' Finally, the Organization for
from the differing places to which, methods by which or quantities in
which the goods are supplied to the purchasers; or
(b) the discrimination is constituted by the doing of an act in good faith to
meet a price or benefit offered by a competitor of the supplier.
(3) In any proceeding for a contravention of sub-section (1), the onus of
establishing that that sub-section does not apply in relation to a discrimination
by reason of sub-section (2) is on the party asserting that sub-section (1) does
not so apply.
(4) A person shall not, in trade or commerce-
(a) knowingly induce or attempt to induce a corporation to discriminate in a
manner prohibited by sub-section (1); or
(b) enter into any transaction that to his knowledge would result in his receiv-
ing the benefit of a discrimination that is prohibited by that subsection.
(5) In any proceeding against a person for a contravention of sub-section (4), it is a
defence if that person establishes that he reasonably believed that, by reason
of sub-section (2), the discrimination concerned was not prohibited by sub-
section (1).
7. Combines Investigation Act of 1960, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23, § 34 (1970).
8. The Irish prohibition of price discrimination is contained in Fair Trading Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1953, 1953 Acts of the
Oireachtas No. 14. See, e.g., article 15(1) of the Restrictive Trade Practices (Radios) Order,
Dublin, May 27, 1955. The Act was repealed in 1972 Acts of the Oireachtas No. 11, § 26,
which merely continued the provisions of the 1953 Act.
9. Price Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945, art. 37(1)(a).
10. Law concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of
Trade of 1947, Law No. 54, art. 2(7) (as amended), translated in 2 E.H.S. Law Bull. Series,
No. 2270 (F. Nakane ed. 1968).
11. Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 27, 1957, BGBI 1081, republished
Apr. 4, 1974, BGBI 869, as amended by Law of June 28, 1976, BGBI 917.
12. The European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome signed
on March 25, 1957 (effective January 1, 1958) by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom subsequently joined the Community on January 1, 1973. Political union is
regarded as the ultimate aim of the Community, but the primary function of the Treaty of
Rome is to create a common market and to approximate economic policies. I THE EUROPA
YEAR BOOK 1979: A WORLD SURVEY 175 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EUROPA YEAR BOOK
1979].
13. Treaty of Rome, arts. 85(1)(d), 86(d), 298 U.N.T.S. 47-49, 11979] 1 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 2005, 2101.
14. This treaty, signed in Paris on April 18, 1951 (effective July 25, 1952), by the six
original members of the European Economic Community, see note 12 supra, formed the
European Coal and Steel Community to pool the coal and steel production of these nations
as a first step towards the creation of a united Europe. See THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1979,
supra note 12, at 183.
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Economic Co-operation and Development15 recently formulated a
guideline requesting enterprises to refrain from discriminatory ac-
tivities.'
The central question in evaluating the various price discrimination
statutes and the OECD guidelines is whether price discrimination is
capable of legal regulation 1" and, more fundamentally, whether price
discrimination should be the subject of legal regulation at all. A princi-
ple obstacle to any legal scheme of trade regulation is a threshold
definitional confusion as to what precisely constitutes the practice of
price discrimination18 and the concomitant lack of clarity in identifying
15. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded
in September of 1961; it replaced the Organization for European Economic Co-operation
(QEEC) which had been established in 1948. The membership of the OECD comprises
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States of America. Yugoslavia participates in the work of the OECD with special status.
The aims of the organization are "[t]o promote economic and social welfare throughout the
OECD area by assisting member governments in the formulation of policies designed to
this end and by co-ordinating these policies; and to stimulate and harmonize its members'
efforts in favour of developing "countries." EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1979, supra note 12, at 242.
16. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
17. In reference to the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act, see, e.g., Adelman,
Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
222, 223-24 (1955):
[S]ince price less cost equals profit, it follows that price discrimination, in the
economic sense, is rigorously defined as a difference in the profit earned from one
customer as against another.
This condition is of course very widespread in the business world. Most of these
profit differentials, which we will henceforth call discriminations, are transitory and
fortuitous. If there were established a condition of perfect non-discrimination this
morning, by nightfall there would be plenty of discrimination, if for no other reason
than unforeseen changes in supply and demand. Those changes make some
customers, some products, some localities, some channels of supply, more
remunerative than others, and an alert business management will always be on the
lookout for these more profitable opportunities and exploit them as best it can.
But this process must under active competition destroy the discriminations
which initiated the process. As business concerns devote their labor and capital to
these more profitable sales, and pro tanto withdraw from less profitable ones, they
increase supply in the one market and decrease it in the other. So long as there is
any profit differential-any discrimination-there remains an incentive to continue
the process until the discrimination has been completely removed; but in the mean-
time, other changes in market conditions have created new differentials. Thus,
under competition, discriminations are always being created and always being
destroyed. To block either the creative or the destructive part of the process is to
block competition.
Id. (footnote omitted).
18. The Supreme Court construed the price discrimination language of the Robinson-
Patman Act synonymously with a price differentiation, stating that "there are no over-
482 Vol. 19:479
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the alleged evils attributable to the practice.19
Obfuscated by forensic rhetoric is the fact that price discrimination
is an economic phenomenon. This economic dimension is frequently ig-
tones of business buccaneering in the § 2(a) phrase 'discriminate in price.' Rather, a price
discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a price difference:' FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960). Cf. ROWE, supra note 2, at 30-31:
Significantly, the "cost" concept contemplated by economists as pertinent to the
ascertainment of whether a price is discriminatory goes far beyond the narrow area
of costs cognizable under the Robinson-Patman cost proviso permitting legal
"justification" of price differentials.
On the one hand, the statutory proviso recognizes only differences in the cost of
"manufacture, sale or delivery" which moreover must result from "differing
methods or quantities" in which the seller's products are "sold and delivered:'
Apart from this limited range of cognizable costs, the application of the proviso
may entertain only "historic" or "actual" costs, so that a price would be legally
"cost-justified" only if the pertinent cost economies are already realized at the time
of the price quotation.
By contrast, the economist's conception of cost is not confined by such limitations
in the class of cognizable costs, but may consider any tangible or intangible element
of cost-such as plant investment, utilization of facilties, credit risks, product dif-
ferentiation-whether or not precisely measurable or allocable to a particular prod-
uct. Furthermore, the economic view of cost is not limited in time to the recogni-
tion of "actual" or "historic" costs, but will take into account any cost anticipated or
realized by the supplier at any time in relation to a product.
Due to the disparity in conceptions, therefore, a price differential may be entirely
nondiscriminatory in economic sense, by reason of cost variations of a range and
character which preclude their recognition under the statutory cost proviso.
This divergence between the legal and economic concepts of discrimination has
several important consequences:
(1) Economic discrimination can exist in the face of universal price equality,
which is entirely lawful under the statute.
(2) Price differentials may or may not be discriminatory in the economic sense,
depending on a wide range of considerations which the statute does not legally
recognize.
(3) Economic discrimination is compelled by the statute whenever it prescribes
price uniformity by sellers among customers which relieve the seller of substantial
elements of cost: i.e., uniform prices as between brand-promoted and unbranded
products; or uniform prices as between customers -whether called jobbers,
wholesalers, or retailers-which perform differing amounts of distributive functions
such as storage, delivery, or promotion. For such uniform prices would treat un-
equals as equal, and force those who get less value from the supplier to pay the
same as those who get more.
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
19. According to the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman amendments, the
alleged evils sought to be banished by its prohibition on price discrimination were the
competitive advantages available to multiple-function firms which had become economically
integrated. See note 2 supra. However, this has been called a Pyrrhic victory by many
who hold that the Act penalizes marketing efficiency and thwarts competition. See RowE,
supra note 2, at 34:
If a businessman actually fulfills the wholesale function by relieving his suppliers
of risk, storage, transportation, administration, etc., his performance, his capital in-
vestment, and the saving to his suppliers, are unaffected by whether he also per-
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nored in the debates surrounding the Robinson-Patman Act and its im-
itations." The policy consequences of enforcing these anti-discrimina-
forms the retailing function, or any number of other functions. A legal rule disquali-
fying him from discounts recognizing wholesaling functions actually performed com-
pels him to render these functions free of charge. The value of the service is
pocketed by the seller who did not earn it.
(citing REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE AN-
TITRUST LAWS 207 (1955)). Contra E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER (2d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as KINTNER], where the author states:
It has been suggested that our antitrust laws are being increasingly enforced
and applied so as to stifle competition and discourage efficiency, whereas the true
purpose of those laws is to preserve competition and stimulate efficiency. Indeed,
the thought is that a number of antitrust laws-including those concerned with
price discrimination-are perhaps themselves anticompetitive in effect, because
they are based on unsound theoretical and empirical foundations.
I do not think that those defects that may exist in antitrust methods can be at-
tributed to fatal flaws in the statutes themselves. The answer may simply be that
the problem of the application of the antitrust statutes, and of their underlying
policies, has inevitably been so difficult that bad law has been created along with
good law.
The Robinson-Patman Act, as well as each of the other antitrust laws, has a firm
empirical base in the economic history of this country....
It can fairly be said, moreover, that the Robinson-Patman Act does not force the
larger buyer to give up the advantages stemming from its greater efficiency-it
can claim a price benefit to the extent justified. The Act simply limits the larger
buyer in the use of its economic power....
The spirit and design of each of the antitrust laws are essentially in favor of
competition and in favor of efficiency. The laws are anticompetitive only in the
sense that they oppose the unfettered competition that would eventually lead to
the destruction of competition. They are antiefficiency only in the sense that they
reject the temporary efficiency offered by the firm seeking dominance in favor of
the more gradual, but more stable, efficiency offered by a fully competitive system.
I do not believe that, when fairly and effectively administered and applied, the
antitrust statutes are anticompetitive in effect. The comparative youth of our an-
titrust statutes, their ambitious scope, and their undoubted complexity have, unfor-
tunately, produced a number of questionable judicial decisions, as well as some law
enforcement of debatable wisdom.
Id. at 343-44 (emphasis in original).
20. At the forefront of the Robinson-Patman debates was an emotional concern for the
survival of the spirit represented by the "mom and pop" store. For example, in the
Robinson-Patman debates Representative Nichols rhapsodized that there was
a certain sentiment and romance about the corner or crossroads grocery store.
There formerly and there now, exists the spit and whittle club. You know, where
the boys gather round the stove in the, winter, sit around its red-hot- fire, chew
tobacco, spit on the bowl and listen to it sizzle, and settle the problems of the Na-
tion, and the problems of the community.
80 CONG. REC. 8134 (1936). Similarly, Representative Wright Patman, one of the sponsors
of the statute warned that:
[T]he day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and done
quickly . . . we have reached the crossroads; we must either turn the food and
1981 Price Discrimination 485
tion statutes cannot properly be evaluated without an examination of
price discrimination in its economic context.21
II. DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS
Price discrimination is a well-known economic concept and is
described in most introductory texts.' Economists, however, eschew
grocery business of this country.., over to a few corporate chains, or we have got
to pass laws that will give the people, who built this country in time of peace and
who saved it in time of war, an opportunity to exist....
Hearings on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062 before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1936).
Strikingly similar concerns animated the debates in the Australian parliament, some
forty years later, on its price discrimination statute. For example, Mr. A. Whitlam ob-
served:
[T]he very survival of small business ... is at stake, at least in respect of the retail
sphere, if section 49 is abolished. I ask all honourable members to have some
regard for the prospects of the survival of those sturdy independent yeomanry
when they come to consider this matter. . . . I ask them to have regard for the
smaller man, the man in the corner store, the man who is not merely a manager
but who owns his business, the man who puts his capital at risk.
30th ParI., 1st Sess., 3rd par., H. of R., 2 Weekly Hansard 291 (1977). Similarly, Mr. Jacobi
declared:
To the small business people throughout the country section 49 is the cornerstore
of survival.
If this section is repealed the result will be a return to the law of the jungle. The
retail chains will increase their holding of the present food market from 60 per cent
to 80 or 90 per cent because of the pressures they can exert on suppliers. No
member of this chamber would have to travel more than 200 yards from where he
lives to see what the large monopolistic retail chains have done to the small corner
shop....
2 Weekly Hansard at 310-11.
21. Paradoxically, despite the apparent motivation of the Robinson-Patman Act to
preserve small businesses, it appears that the enforcement activities of the Federal Trade
Commission have been targeted disproportionately against them. See, e.g., Banta & Field,
FTC Orders Issued Under the Price Discrimination Law: An Evaluation, 3 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REv. 89 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Banta & Field]; KINTNER, supra note 19,
at 15-16. For a thorough discussion of enforcement policies and practices, see KINTNER,
supra note 19, at 306-39.
22. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws 333-34 (1955):
Price discrimination, in the economic sense, occurs whenever and to the extent that
there are price differences for the same product or service sold by a single seller,
and not accounted for by cost differences or by changes in the level of demand; or
when two or more buyers of the same goods and services are charged the same
price despite differences in the cost of serving them. In order to know when there
is or is not price discrimination, in the economic sense, between two or more
buyers, it is necessary to know not only the price but also the total costs applicable
to each class of transaction under comparison.
The actual lower costs of serving one or more buyers can arise from a great
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simple, all-inclusive definitions of the practice. The reason for this
definitional reluctance is two-fold: first, from a theoretical point of
view, the theoretical concept of price discrimination has undergone a
slow definitional evolution;2 second, the manifestations of price
discrimination in practice are multifarious and defy an all-embracing
definition.2'
Modern economic theorists agree that price discrimination occurs
where separate units of a product are sold at price differentials not
directly matching the differences in the supply cost of each product.2
In economic terms, then, price discrimination results whenever dif-
ferentials in price for a single product are not related to differentials in
incremental costs. For example, economic price discrimination will in-
clude cases where units of a good or service with equal supply costs.
variety of circumstances. The product sold to some buyers may be physically
somewhat different, in lacking certain appliances or finishing touches or quality.
There may be differences in the services which go along with the goods to form the
complete package for which consideration is given-such services as delivery,
packaging, storage, credit extension, risk of default, handling, clerical attention,
sales force attention, and many others.
See also, ROWE, supra note 2:
By contrast with the statutory equation of a price difference with a price
discrimination, the economic concept of discrimination considers price in relation to
all surrounding elements of the transaction which ultimately affect the seller's
costs. Hence a nominal price identity between customers will produce an economic
discrimination if reflecting cost variations; while a nominal price disparity, if coupled
with corresponding cost variations may show economic equality.
... Contrary to an important legal premise of the Robinson-Patman Act, price
variations are not causally based on costs, but on the interplay of manifold
economic pressures.
Under competitive business conditions, costs are only part of the panorama of
price. A monopolist or "public utility" sheltered from competition may have plenary
power to set his prices on the basis of "cost." But sellers exposed to market forces
must quote prices responsive to the pressures of competition and other external
forces which curtail their own pricing discretion and exercise not only bookeeping
but also strategic judgments. In any event, their prices are not based on cost, but
respond to a variety of pressures. Indeed, prices-which influence sales, hence pro-
duction volume, which in turn governs the efficiency of the firm's plant utiliza-
tion-may determine the unit cost of the ultimate output more directly than vice
versa.
Id. at 29, 31.
23. For a discussion of the evolution of price discrimination theory, see M. GREENHUT
& H. OHTA, THEORY OF SPATIAL PRICING AND MARKET AREAS ch. 3 (1975).
24. See, e.g., the 20 or more different types of price discrimination listed in Machlup,
Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, NATIONAL BUREAU COMMITTEE OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONFERENCE REPORT, BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
397-435 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Machlup].
25. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 209 (3d ed. 1966).
Vol. 19:479
Price Discrimination
are sold at different prices and where units of a good or service with
differing supply costs are sold at the same price. However, the view
taken by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,26 was
that the Robinson-Patman Act evisaged only those discriminations
which involved price differences.' This simplistic approach of the
Supreme Court obviously overcomes the complex definitional problem
of embracing in a single description the multitude of ways in which
price discrimination may manifest itself. This simplicity, however, does
very little to isolate any pernicious instances of price discrimination
from those instances which may have desirable consequences.
For the purpose of economic analysis, price discrimination may be
classified according to (1) the purposes for which discrimination is prac-
ticed, (2) the degree of discriminatory power that is employed, or
(3) the techniques of discrimination which are used. In integrating
these classificatory approaches, it is typical to identify three main sub-
categories of price discrimination, namely, personal discrimination
based upon differences between individual customers; group discrimi-
nation between classes of customers; and product discrimination, under
which different products are offered at discriminatory prices.28 An
economist's evaluation of these multifarious forms of price discrimina-
tion will be in terms of their income distribution effects, efficiency ef-
fects, and their impact upon market structure and competitive pro-
cesses. These economic criteria are discussed below.' To some extent,
they all form the basis for regulating price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act. However, of primary importance are the im-
plications which each of the forms of price discrimination have for the
promotion of competition. In this regard a very important distinction
26. 363 U.S. 536 (1960). See note 2 supra.
27. The Supreme Court observed that
ITlhe statute itself spells out the conditions which make a price difference illegal or
legal, and we would derange this integrated statutory scheme were we to read
other conditions into the law by means of the nondirective phrase, "discriminate in
price." . . . As one commentator has succinctly put it, "Inevitably every legal
controversy over any price difference would shift from the detailed governing pro-
visions -'injury,' cost justification, 'meeting competition,' etc.-over into the
'discrimination' concept for ad hoc resolution divorced from the specifically perti-
nent statutory text."
363 U.S. at 550-51 (quoting Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The
Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1956)).
28. This integrative approach has been adopted by Professor F. Machlup; see note 24
supra. Machlup made use of and modified a scheme of classification suggested by Cassady,
Techniques and Purposes of Price Discrimination, 11 J. MARKETING 135 (1946). The com-
prehensiveness of Machlup's classification makes it a fruitful source of analysis of price
discrimination and it is most recently employed in SCHERER, supra note 5, at 255-57.
Machlup's descriptive labels appear in the text hereinafter.
29. See text accompanying notes 59-82 infra.
1981
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can be drawn between those discriminatory forms which are episodic
or evanescent in effect and between systematic or prolonged discrimi-
natory practices. It will be argued that only the latter instances of
price discrimination ought to be proscribed as they are more often
than not likely to be the instances of price discrimination which have a
deleterious effect upon competition. This distinction between in-
nocuous episodic discriminations and reprehensible systematic discrim-
inations must, therefore, be borne in mind as each of the forms of price
discrimination is described.
Personal discrimination describes differential treatment between
individuals based upon their bargaining strength, eagerness to buy, or
the competitive opportunities of each. Examples of personal discrimina-
tion include the "haggle-every-time" type, where eath transaction is a
separately negotiated bargain with buyers who are not regular
customers but a fluctuating group with varying composition, such as
used car purchasers who are granted "trade-in" allowances. The prin-
cipal influences upon the seller in this sort of market are the terms
which the customer claims are obtainable from competitors of the
seller. Another commonly occuring episodic discriminatory form is the
"size-up-his-income" type, where wealthier customers are charged ac-
cording to their ability to pay. Typical examples include the pricing of
legal and medical services. Both of these forms of personal discrimina-
tion are not likely to contravene the Robinson-Patman Act since, being
of short duration, they are unlikely to produce the three forms of anti-
competitive harm proscribed by that statute, namely, damage to an in-
dividual purchaser, a substantial lessening of competition in the
market at large, or a tendency on the part of the supplier towards
monopoly in a line of commerce.
A form of personal discrimination which may have positively pro-
competitive effect is the "give-in-if-you-must" type, where buyers are
regular customers extorting secret (', ?artures from a seller's price list
in a market where business is slack, capacity is under-utilized, and
knowledge of the market is based upon rumor. In this sort of market,
secret discriminations will erode any propensity towards uniform and
parallel pricing by sellers." On the other hand, a form of personal
discrimination which may produce anti-competitive effects is the "let-
him-pay-more" type where higher prices are exacted by a seller from
customers in proximity to the point of shipment. These customers are
unlikely to incur the expense of seeking out competitors of the
discriminatory seller in more distant markets. This pricing practice,
which may have the effect of charging the proximate customers "phan-
tom" or unincurred freight costs, is to be condemned in that the
30. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
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premium paid by the proximate purchasers may undermine their ability
to compete with their more distant competitors who may not incur this
impost. 1 In order for this latter pricing practice to give rise to an anti-
competitive effect, it must eventually be identified as a systematic oc-
currence.
Group discrimination aims at taking advantage of differences be-
tween groups of buyers. Examples include price differentiated accord-
ing to the customer's age, sex, membership of certain organizations, oc-
cupational category, or distribution function; or based upon the loca-
tion of customer groupings or the uses to which the seller's product is
put by different groups.
A typical form of group discrimination based upon customer location
is the "keep-them-in-their-zones" type in which the seller exonerates
purchasers from freight charges incurred in delivering his product to
geographic zones delineated by him. This will have the effect of
preventing resales by intermediate purchasers beyond their
designated zones since, in incurring freight charges by selling beyond
their zones, they would be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the freight-free
inhabitants of the zones into which they would intrude. By preventing
resales in this way, the discriminatory seller could of course charge a
higher than competitive price in each zone confident that these prices
would not be undercut. Of equal anti-competitive influence is the fact
31. See Comment, Indirect Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw.
U.L. REV. 225, 227-28 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Comment], where the author states:
A . . . class of indirect discrimination cases under Section 2(a) concerns the so-
called "phantom" freight and freight charge absorption cases which were produced
by the basing point system. Under this system, freight charges are computed from
a base point other than the actual place of manufacture or shipment. Apparent
equality of treatment exists where competing buyers pay the same factory price for
goods of like grade and quality to which freight costs (uniformly charged from a
base point) are added. Among competing buyers in different localities, however,
there is an inherent discrimination. Buyers at places where the freight cost from
the point of shipment was greater than from the basing point are favored as
against buyers at places where the freight cost from the point of shipment was less
than from the basing point. Favored buyers thus pay less than actual freight costs.
In effect, the seller absorbs the difference and enables a favored buyer to make a
saving. Non-favored buyers pay more than actual freight ("phantom" freight).
Theoretically, the seller thereby offsets his absorption expense by means of such
fictitious charges.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
In Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), the basing point was
Chicago for products shipped from Kansas City and delivered prices were computed by
adding the cost of freight from Chicago to points of delivery. The Supreme Court held
this basing point system invalid as an indirect price discrimination prohibited by section
2(a) of the Clayton Act and found it immaterial that there was no price discrimination be-
tween buyers at the same points of delivery since section 2(a) also extended protection to
competing buyers in different localities. 324 U.S. at 734.
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that the intermediate purchasers of each zone are aware of the
unlikelihood of inter-zone price competition. Therefore, they would be
prepared to pay higher prices for the seller's product since this can be
recouped from their retail customers who have no alternative sources
of supply2 2 These different zones may be created by the seller absorb-
ing some of the costs incurred in dealing with the more distant
geographic zones, a form of "indirect" discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act2 3 More likely in the commercial context is that
"phantom freight" will be imposed on customers in the neighboring
zones to subsidize dealings with the more distant zones. Zone
discrimination invariably has anti-competitive consequences for pur-
chasers wishing to sell beyond their designated areas, thereby war-
ranting the application of the Robinson-Patman Act.3 Zone pricing on
an industry-wide basis would of course be susceptible to attack under
section 1 of the Sherman Act as a proscribed contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce by industry members.3 5
32. On the economics of resale price maintenance, see S. GAMMELGAARD, RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE (1958); E. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION
(1939); RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (B. Yamey ed. 1966); Bowman, The Prerequisites and
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (1955).
33. A direct price discrimination means outwardly charging two different prices of
competing customers for goods of like grade and quality, whereas the absorption of cost
differentials would generally constitute a form of indirect price discrimination. The
Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), held that sec-
tion 2(a) of the Clayton Act proscribed both direct and indirect price discriminations; the
Court rejected the argument that it prohibited discriminations in price only, stating that
all indirect discriminations affected by terms and conditions of sale were covered by sec-
tion 2(a). Id. at 740. See Comment, supra note 31, at 226, where the author elaborates on
the concept of indirect price discrimination:
This very broad meaning attributed to "indirect" provides insight into the concept
of "price discrimination" itself. In conventional terminology, "price" is the value or
worth which is given in exchange for something. "Discrimination" is differential
treatment of some sort. If this definition of "price discrimination" is applied, it
would follow that no price discrimination could ever exist where a seller charged
his customers identical prices for goods of like grade and quality. The cases arising
under the Act, however, strengthen the implication drawn from legislative history
that a substantially broader concept of "price discrimination" was intended by Con-
gress. For example, a seller may perform some service for a favored buyer, such as
special packaging, which would enable the latter to make a cost saving that
enhances the profitableness of his operations. Discriminations of this kind,
unassociated with "price" in a strict sense, would violate the Act. It is with
reference to subterfuges which produce economic advantages other than reduced
prices that the scope of "price discrimination" under the Act really becomes signifi-
cant....
The concept of indirect price discrimination under the Act then must be expanded
to include both subterfuges which have the effect of reducing prices and those
which create some economic advantage other than price reduction.
34. See, e.g., Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
35. See, e.g., Allied Paper Mills, 40 F.T.C. 696 (1945), affd, in part, 168 F.2d 600 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); National Crepe Paper Ass'n of America, 38
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Two other forms of delivered pricing, involving group discrimination
on a systematic basis, are "play-the-game" or basing point discrimina-
tion where sellers meet the prices charged by competitors throughout
the market-place,} and "match-the-freight" where a seller, "in an at-
tempt to overcome the competitive disadvantage of being located fur-
ther away from a customer than some of his competitors, offers to
absorb the excess of actual freight over the lowest freight from any
competitor's plant to the destination."'  Both of these instances of
group discrimination, being organized on a systematic basis, will fall a-
foul of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibition and will not even be
defensible under section 2(b) of the Act as a result of the Supreme
Court's statement in FTC v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.M that the
Act "places emphasis on individual competitive situations, rather than
upon a general system of competition." 9
An unsystematic and sporadic form of geographic discrimination is
"dump-the-surplus" discrimination, where sellers dispose of surpluses
outside their regular markets at lower than usual prices. Dumping
usually takes place in overseas markets to avoid depressing local
prices,'" but predation may sometimes be a motive."' The systematic
reduction of prices by a seller only in the markets served by com-
petitors is referred to as "kill-the-rival" discrimination. 2 Distinguishing
predatory pricing from unobjectionable dumping may be difficult in
practice since below cost pricing, if it ever occurs, 3 will not be sustained
for more than a very short period of time" and thus to some extent
F.T.C. 282 (1944), affd sub. nom. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
36. For example, the adoption of Pittsburgh, Birmingham, or Evanston-Chicago as
the points from which the prices of rolled steel will be computed. See Marengo, The Bas-
ing Point Decisions and the Steel Industry, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 526 (1945).
37. Machlup, supra note 24, at 406.
38. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
39. Id. at 753.
40. See J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966).
41. See Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Discovery of the
Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAW. 227 (1977).
42. See Machlup, supra note 24, at 408.
43. On the definitional problem, see Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Em-
pirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); Koller, On the Definition of
Predatory Pricing, 20 ANTRITRUST BULL. 329 (1975); Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting:
Notes and Comments, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 129 (1972).
44. See the learned exchange among various scholars as reported in the following
series of articles: Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Scherer, Predatory Pricing Under
the Sherman Act. A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on
Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REV. 891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on
Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A
Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 97 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Areeda & Turner, Williamson
on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978).
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blurs the distinction sought to be drawn between systematic and
sporadic discriminations. However, the discrepancy between the dis-
criminatory prices will often evidence a predatory scheme or system. 5
Group discrimination according to customer status 6 includes
"promote-new-customers" type where new customers are offered
prices lower than those paid by established customers in the hope of
developing new customer allegiance. Reduced periodical subscriptions
to new subscribers presents a typical example of this category. This
form of price discrimination is unobjectionable unless it is of the
"favor-the-big-ones" type which was the sort of discrimination extorted
by chain stores that actuated the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act
in the first place.4" Equally prohibited is the "protect-the-middleman"
type of discrimination where large retail purchasers who incur the cost
of performing their own warehousing and distribution are charged the
same prices as retailers purchasing from wholesale customers of the
discriminatory seller. The seller, in protecting the middleman by
removing from the large retailer the advantages of functional integra-
tion, may cause anti-competitive harm in the wholesale market even
though price uniformity obtains in the retail market.48 Resale price
maintenance often motivates this form of discrimination. A more bla-
tant form of resale price maintenance is enforced by "hold-them-in-line"
discrimination where retailers who fail to comply with a seller's list
price suggestions are denied special discounts or refunds granted to
those who behave. 9
Finally, numerous forms of price discrimination are based upon prod-
uct use or, more specifically, the differing intensities of demand
evidenced by different purchasers for the same product. An obvious
example of this is "charge-what-the-traffic-will-bear" discrimination by
railways where higher ton-per-mile rates are charged for expensive
high-profit items, such as fabrics, than for cheaper materials such as
coal. Another form of price discrimination based on product use is
"get-the-most-from-each-group" discrimination which involves price dif-
ferences more directly based upon differing intensities of demand. An
example of this is the price of industrial electricity as compared with
that of domestic rates."
45. See the authorities cited in Gifford, Promotional Price Cutting and Section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 1045.
46. See Machlup, supra note 24, at 411.-
47. On the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Kintner, supra note
19, at 1-16; ROWE, supra note 2, at 3-23.
48. See Law, The Performance of Distribution Functions as Legal Justification for
Price Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 69 DICK. L. REv. 39 (1964).
49. See Machlup, supra note 24, at 413.
50. It should be noted that, in addition to the possible Robinson-Patman actionability,
discriminatory pricing by public utilities may be regulated by many statutes. Among the
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Other forms of product price discrimination may simply involve no
more than product differentiation. Examples include "appealing-to-
classes" discrimination in which differences in price are associated
with premium quality rather than increased production costs. This is il-
lustrated by differences in price between expensive and cheap seats in
theatres and airplanes, standard and deluxe automobiles, clothbound
and paperback books. Similarly, "make-them-pay-more-for-the-label"
price discrimination entails the supply of physically homogenous prod-
ucts under differently priced brand labels. All of these attempts to
differentiate products will fail for Robinson-Patman purposes if the
goods are still considered to be "of like grade quality" within the
meaning of the Act.51 "Clear-the-stock" price discrimination involves
the differentiation by a seller of his product through the granting of
price concessions at special times such as pre-Christmas or summer
sales. Similar to this is the "switch-them-to-off-peak-times" discrimina-
tion which typically influences the pricing of electricity and telephone
charges by public utilities and of hotel rates and theater tickets. A
final form of product price discrimination is "get-the-most-for-each-
product" type which addresses itself to product use and involves
charging discriminatory prices for physically differentiated products
that involve common processes in their manufacture; for example, the
price of a fan which has an electromotor as a main component as com-
pared to the price of a vacuum cleaner which uses the same elec-
tromotor.52
The great diversity of price discrimination forms outlined above
highlights the difficulties of definition which confront not only the
economists but lawyers as well. From the lawyer's perspective the
problem is compounded by the fact that in defining the forms of
discrimination to be proscribed, the relevant definitions may include
certain beneficial examples of the practice and exclude more malignant
manifestations. To illustrate, a prohibition aimed at all forms of price
discrimination will sweep away not only predatory practices, but also
first federal excursions into this field were the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104,
§ 2, 24 Stat. 379 (current version of 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (Supp. III 1979)); the Elkins Anti-
Rebate Act of 1903, ch. 708, § 1, 32 Stat. 847 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11902 (Supp.
M 1979)); the Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 2, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 10761 (Supp. III 1979)); The Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); and the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 404, 41 Stat.
456 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (Supp. III 1979)).
51. See ROWE, supra note 2, at 63-76; Gifford, Price Discrimination and Labelling, 25
BUFF. L. REv. 395 (1976); Rowe, Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation: The
Issues under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956).
52. This form of discrimination is unlikely to be actionable under the Robinson-
Patman Act as the relevant discrimination will not harm competitors.
53. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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the secret off-list discriminations which prevent the erection of
uniform pricing structures in oligopolized markets."
III. EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Given the diversity of economic price discrimination types, it must
be considered whether all or any of the manifestations of the practice
ought to be the subject of legal regulation. In considering this question
the policy objectives of the various anti-discrimination statutes should
be borne in mind. The political idiosyncrasies of each national
legislature probably determine the short-term objectives of the respec-
tive regulatory schemes, but in the long run the central objective of
the statutes will reflect a balance between the objectives of economic
efficiency, social equity, and political freedom. This long-term objective
is reflected in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in deci-
sions like United States v. Topco Associates,55 where the Court observed:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster.5
The weight which ought to be ascribed to each of these objectives is
the subject of a burgeoning literature on the objectives of antitrust
law. 57 It may be that the free enterprise guaranteed by the Sherman
Act is inconsistent with the protection extended small business by the
54. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
55. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
56. Id. at 610.
57. An early discussion on the objectives of antitrust policy took place in a series of
exchanges between Professors H.M. Blake and W.K. Jones of Columbia University and
Professors R.H. Bork and W.S. Bowman, Jr. of Yale University, The Goals of Antitrust: A
Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 377, 401, 417, 422 (1965). More recent discus-
sions include P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRIN-
CIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1978); R.H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Ef-
ficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Pitofsky, The Political Con-
tent of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pitofsky]. Congres-
sional hearings on this topic include The Role of Small Business in our Society Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong, 1st Sess. (1975); Symposium on the
Economic Social and Political Effects of Economic Concentration Before the Sub-comm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Vol. 19:479494
Price Discrimination
Robinson-Patman Act,5 but for an economist the implication of price
discrimination for the pro-competitive objectives of antitrust legisla-
tion are best assessed by reference to three guiding criteria: income
distribution effects, efficiency effects, and the impact of price discrimi-
nation upon market structure.
A. Income Distribution Effects
Generally speaking, the income distribution effects of economic price
discrimination are self-evident, namely, that the practice causes a
redistribution of income towards the discriminator away from his
customers. 9 Also, self evidently, the reason that a seller discriminates
is to make greater profits than would be the case without discrimina-
tion. These profits are made at the expense of purchasers and are
usually manifested in the form of higher than competitive prices. For
example, consider Professor Cooper's illustration: It costs $49 to pro-
duce and supply one widget to one customer. The state of demand for
this product is such that there is one customer who would pay $100 for
a widget, four customers who would pay $90 for one widget each, and
three more customers who would pay $50 for one each. If the seller
were to price individually he would sell eight widgets for $610, incur
costs of $392 and, thus, realize a profit of $218. If the seller were obliged
to charge a profit-maximizing single price he would charge $90 to sell
five widgets for $450, realizing a profit of $205. At a uniform price of
$100, he would make only one sale, realizing total revenues of $100 and
a profit of $51; at a uniform price of $50 he would make eight sales and
realize total revenues of $400 and a profit of only $8." The income
58. Small businesses are protected in that to bring an action under the Robinson-
Patman Act, they merely have to demonstrate an injury to themselves rather than to
competition at large. The Act may thus bolster the position of enterprises which would
otherwise have been too inefficient to survive. See generally R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (1976).
59. The principal advantage given to a discriminatory seller from secondary-line
discrimination is that he may be able to use profits exploited in one market to underwrite
predatory assault in another. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967), where the Court held that despite the lack of proof of injury to competition, the
adverse effect of pricing competition on a competitor was sufficient to justify a violation
of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 386 U.S. at 702-03. The only injury, however,
was the plaintiff's loss of market dominance as a result of competitive pricing which it had
itself engendered. Critics describe the decision as having effectively turned the antitrust
law into a law against price competition, which is the hallmark of a competitive market.
See Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J.
70 (1967). For a retrospective analysis see Elzinga & Hogarty, Utah Pie and the Conse-
quences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & Econ. 427 (1978).
60. Cooper, Price Discrimination and Economic Efficiency, 75 MICH. L. REv. 962, 964
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
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transfers attending these discriminations are easily illustrated. For ex-
ample, the discriminating seller who charged $100 to the customer
with the most intense demand would have extracted $51 more than
from the customer who paid the competitive price of $49.
The social desirability of this income redistribution ultimately
becomes a matter not of economic theory but of political philosophy."'
The discriminating widget manufacturer made his maximum profit of
$218 with an output of eight widgets; his profit-maximizing single price
would have involved the production of only five widgets, which may
have produced a reduction of labor employment, contrary to another of
the objectives of modern antitrust legislation. The inflationary evils at-
tendant upon income transfer must also be balanced against the socially
desirable consequences of this process. For example, a lawyer who
serves high income clients may be able to finance socially desirable
welfare cases out of the surplus income derived from the objects of his
discriminatory pricing. This form of income redistribution is implicitly
sanctioned by progressive income tax legislation. Moreover, the ability
to discriminate may enable the provision of a service which would not
otherwise be provided. As the widget example demonstrates, price
discrimination allows a greater total profit than does uniform pricing;
there may be market situations where the added revenue attainable
through price discrimination makes the difference between providing a
legal or medical service and foregoing it entirely.
B. Efficiency Effects
Economists generally agree that price discrimination requires three
preconditions: first, the discriminator must possess some market
power, ie., be able to control the price of his product; second, the
discriminator must be able to separate his customers into categories
with different price elasticities of demand, in other words, according to
the responsiveness of demand to changes in price; and, third, there
must be no chance for arbitrage (resales between the differently priced
markets). According to economic theory, under perfect price
discrimination the output of the discriminator would be identical to
that of the competitive market. There would be no substitution away
from the discriminator's product, because he would vary his price in
accordance with the intensity of each purchaser's demand. The
discriminator would not turn away a single sale that he could make at
a price higher than his cost of production, thereby disposing of all his
61. For example, this income redistribution can be equated with the egalitarian im-
pulse of progressive taxation. On the other hand, the elimination of discriminatory pricing




output which his customers wished to purchase at the very prices they
wished to pay. Moreover, it is arguable that not only is a seller able to
satisfy all his existing customers through discriminatory pricing, but
he may be able to add new categories of customers that he would not
otherwise have been able to approach.2 In some circumstances,
discrimination would enable a supplier to enter a market which would
not otherwise have been served."
Price discrimination, despite its efficiencies for the seller, has been
criticized as inefficient because purchasers from a discriminator would
be paying more than a competitive price for the discriminator's pro-
duct. This criticism derives from the above model of perfect price
discrimination because the model assumes that the practice invariably
takes place in a noncompetitive market where the producer can sell all
of his products because of his ability to divine the maximum price each
customer is willing to pay. An objection to the theoretical model is
that in the real world the discriminator faces almost insuperable prob-
lems in obtaining information about the demand intensities of his dif-
ferent customers. Consequently, he is unable to pitch his various prices
at the precise levels which his different customers are prepared to
pay. On the other hand, it has been argued that this ignorance has a
beneficial effect because a discriminator will tend to group his
customers. This response reduces output to those from whom he ex-
pects the lowest profits and increases output to those from whom he
expects the highest." This increase in output may attract its own effi-
ciencies in the form of scale economies which would further reduce
marginal production costs, thereby enabling the discriminator to reach
a wider market.
An evaluation of the efficiency effects of price discrimination must
certainly take into account the varying efficiencies of the different
techniques of price discrimination previously outlined. For example,
the various forms of personal discrimination represent the attempt by
a seller to tailor his price in accordance with the varying intensities of
demand exhibited by each individual customer. These forms of price
discrimination, therefore, most closely approximate the theoretic
model of perfect price discrimination which enables, as we saw in the
62. If a seller was obliged to charge a profit maximizing single price he might select
one which excludes the lower income purchaser. On the other hand, if he was allowed to
charge a range of prices, profits made at the higher range of a price schedule might sub-
sidize sales to persons at the lower range of the schedule.
63. The lack of appeal presented by a sparsely populated market might be overcome
if a seller was allowed to use profits from higher prices in a more profitable market to
underwrite an exploratory marketing campaign to develop sales in the less appealing
market.
64. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 965.
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widget example, a seller to maximize output and resource utilization.
The various forms of group discrimination, on the other hand, would
produce inefficiencies both to the extent that a seller incurs expense in
maintaining artificial group boundaries, such as the "keep-them-in-
their-zones" type, and to the extent that a seller's groupings do not
reflect commercial realities."
The precondition that a seller possess some market power in order
to discriminate in price calls for a consideration of the efficiency
aspects of price discrimination in a monopoly context. Insofar as the
discriminating monopolist can charge a higher than competitive price,
the scarce resources of purchasers are diverted into the dis-
criminator's market." Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it
has been suggested that the existence or expectation of monopoly prof-
its will attract resources into the market of the monopolist until the
price which the monopolist can charge for his product is reduced to a
normal level.' Since this equilibration is produced not by a decline in
profit but an increase in costs, the resources thus attracted into the
monopolized market are wasted from the standpoint of economic effi-
ciency. 8 Additional resource wastage may be incurred by the
discriminatory monopolist's attempts to prevent resales between pur-
chasers in different priced markets, for example by "hold-them-in-line"
type price discrimination"9 which may cause anti-competitive harm at
the secondary level of competition.
C. Market Structure and Competition Effects
The price discrimination prerequisite of market power assumes a
fairly concentrated market structure in which the discriminator is
either a monopolist or a cartel. The alleged evils of market concentra-
tion1 cannot be attributed to price discrimination which is a conse-
65. For example, the "protect-the-middleman" type, see text accompanying note 48
supra, ignores the reality of functional integration and involves a misallocation of
resources to the extent that an integrated wholesaler-retailer receives no reward for per-
forming a wholesaling function after incurring the expense of establishing a wholesaling
capacity.
66. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
67. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
68. This wastage consists of the expenditures incurred by a person entering a market
to attract customers away from the monopolist. Since the higher monopoly price induced
the entry of competitors into the market, the competition for customers will not involve
the reduction of prices but will involve, for example, expenditures on advertising. See 0.
FIRESTONE, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ADVERTISING (1967).
69. See note 49 and accompanying text supra; Yamey, Monopolistic Price Discrimina-
tion and Economic Welfare, 17 J.L. & ECON. 377 (1974).
70. Market concentration is said to serve as a barrier to market entry by potential
competitors, thereby causing excessive profits in the hands of the market dominator, rising
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quence of that concentration, not a determinant of it. However, the
ability to discriminate in price, by increasing the expected gains of
market concentration, makes monopolization a more profitable activity
than it would be if only a single price had to be charged. The increased
expenditures made to obtain market power must also represent a
deadweight social cost in excess of the social costs usually associated
with monopoly pricing. These increased costs to society of market con-
centration may of course be bearable if society wishes to use monopoly
pricing as a device for inducing a greater expenditure on innovation
than would otherwise be forthcoming, such as the discriminatory pric-
ing by patentees.
In evaluating the market structure and competition effects of price
discrimination, the important distinction between sporadic discrimina-
tion and the more systematic forms of the practice must be
remembered. Some sporadic forms of price discrimination are made
possible by customer inertia and by the time lag attending the spread
of price information among buyers. The factum of time lag has been used
to account for price discrimination in the labor market,7' housing
market," and in the automobile market.73 This form of price discrimina-
tion is inevitably evanescent and can have little ultimate effect upon
market structure. Some sporadic price discrimination, however, is
often an indicium of effective price competition and, indeed, a natural
concomitant of dynamic economic life. A case example is a seller ex-
periencing a heightened intensity of demand for his product in one
geographic locality. Before he can construct additional capacity to take
up the demand, he may consider it a convenient form of product ration-
ing to charge a higher price in the area where demand is most intense,
or he may shift his output to the area of intense demand and pro tanto
withdraw from the less remunerative areas. Either form of discrimina-
tion will attract the attention of trade rivals who will either move into
the area of greater remuneration or acquire some of the seller's un-
wanted customers in the areas of lower remuneration. In either event,
the seller will have to reduce capacity or seek to capture new
inflation, and a serious misallocation of resources. An evaluation of these allegations is
contained in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann &
J. Watson eds. 1974).
71. Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing and Resource Unemployment, in E. PHELPS.
MICRO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INFORMATION THEORY 27-52 (1970); Mc-
Call, Economics of Infornaation and Job Search, 84 Q.J. ECON. 113 (1970); Stigler, Informa-
tion in the Labour Market, 70 J. POL. ECON. SuPP. 94 (1962).
72. Fenton, Price Discrimination Under Non-Monopolistic Conditions, 8 APPLIED
ECON. 135 (1976).
73. Jung, Price Variations Among Automobile Dealers in Metropolitan Chicago, 33
J. Bus. 31 (1960).
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customers from his trade rivals. The spiral of price competition
precipitated by the original price discrimination will have effectively
restored a uniform equilibrium price.
In other words, as long as there is any profit differential making
some customers, products, localities, or channels of supply more
remunerative than others, there will be a natural incentive to
discriminate until the differential has been completely removed. In the
meantime, of course, other changes in market conditions may have
created new differentials calling forth new discriminations.7 4
Sporadic discriminatory pricing can also be an essential experimen-
tal technique by firms selectively probing the market before initiating
more comprehensive price changes. A seller's reluctance to make price
cuts may result from membership of a price cartel which maintains a
uniform price list. Where market information is imperfect, some
members of the cartel may be prepared to grant secret concessions to
aggressive buyers in order to utilize capacity more fully in "give-in-if-
you-must" price discrimination. 5 Internecine price competition may
then develop between cartel members as they are played off, one
against the other, by their customers. List prices will become increas-
ingly unrealistic and will progressively be abandoned. The consequent
undermining of oligopolistic discipline and morale may make future
cartel organization impossible.
The same effect will be experienced in an oligopolized industry con-
sisting of a few sellers of a standard commodity, without close
substitutes, who can supply the total market. Even without a price
agreement between industry members, prices will tend to become
"sticky" so that any seller's price initiatives would quickly be emulated
by the others, leaving little incentive for individual price changes. In
this context, a discriminatory price cut granted to one customer may
be the crack which spreads to others and crumbles the industry's rigid
price wall. The competition effects of sporadic price discrimination are
thus eloquently summarized by Adelman who declares that "sporadic,
unsystematic discrimination is one of the most powerful forces of com-
petition in modern industrial markets. Like a high wind it seizes on
small openings and crevices in an 'orderly' price structure and tears it
apart."7
The conceptual distinction between sporadic price discrimination
and systematic price discrimination is critical: systematic price
discrimination is invariably anti-competitive in effect. The most ob-
vious example of the anti-competitive evil of systematic price
74. See Adelman, note 17 supra.
75. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.




discrimination is the "kill-the-rival"" type where a seller, drawing on
market power in one market, can utilize these assured revenues to
finance predatory price cuts in another market, which local rivals
without comparably secure resources may find impossible to match.
Upon their consequent demise, the predator will have obtained a new
reservoir of market power from which to generate further predation.
A discriminator may use similar techniques to entrench its market
position by raising barriers to the entry of new competitors. For exam-
ple, United Shoe Machinery Corp. depicts how a firm preserved its
eighty-five percent share of the market by accepting much lower rates
of return on shoe machinery which faced competition than on that
which it supplied in the absence of competition.78 In this way the cor-
poration made it difficult for rivals to enter the industry, thereby re-
maining the only manufacturer offering a complete range of shoe
machinery. This itself was a further barrier to entry into the industry
as rival entrants would have to offer the full range of machinery to at-
tract business away from the corporation.
As well as the impairment of competition at the seller level,
systematic discrimination may also produce anti-competitive effects at
the bhyer level and beyond. For example, discrimination according to
customer location involving the absorption of cost differentials, by
eliminating the competitive advantage of the more spatially proximate
customer, would tend to inhibit inter-customer competition." Similarly,
"hold-them-in-line" 8° price discrimination would produce the economic
evils of resale price maintenance, while "protect-the-middleman"'
discrimination would impair functional integration and inhibit the
realization of customer's scale economies. General competitive distor-
tion would be experienced at the buyer level by all the various forms
of group price discrimination which cluster buyers in functional or loca-
tion categories that do not reflect any cost differences in dealing with
those categories.82
Applying the touchstone criteria of income distribution effects, effi-
ciency effects, and market structure and competition effects, a tenable
case has been made out for the legal prohibition of systematic, as op-
posed to sporadic, price discrimination.
77. See note 42 and accompaning text supra.
78. C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION (1956).
79. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
82. Group discriminations which do not reflect the different costs of dealing with
those groups will not, of course, be able to form the basis of a cost justification defense




IV. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
There is a considerable body of scholarship indicating a lack of con-
fidence in the law and legal procedures to regulate effectively the
various economic phenomena collectively described as restrictive trade
practices. Much of this scholarship tends to overestimate the efficacy
of economics as a regulatory tool8 and tends to ignore evaluative
criteria other than the economic objective of the promotion of effective
competition, such as the political and social objectives of antitrust
law.8  Assuming, however, the primacy of the promotion of competition
as an objective of antitrust law, a brief assessment ought to be made
as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act adopts the most appropriate
statutory form to reflect this emphasis.
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act suggests that
the congressional sponsors of the Act were not concerned about seller
discriminations so much as the extortion of favorable trading terms by
the chain stores at the expense of small businesses.88 With this objec-
tive in mind, it is surprising that the prohibition by section 2(f) of
buyer abuses was seemingly inserted as an after-thought.87 The defini-
tion of prohibited buyer abuses by that provision as, inter alia, the in-
ducement of prohibited seller abuses, resembles the Imperial Chinese
edict which sought to abolish kidnaping by making the payment of ran-
soms a capital offense.
The protection of small business is apparently secured by the pro-
hibition in the statute of discriminations which cause injury to in-
dividuals rather than to competition at large. Interestingly, research
seems to indicate that enforcement of the Act has been targeted
disproportionately against small businesses,88 although it seems that
83. See the authorities cited at note 57 supra; P. ASCI, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE
ANTITRUST DILEMMA (1970); J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE BEHAVIOUR
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1972); Brennan, A Legal-Economic Dichotomy: Contribution to
Failure in Regulatory Policy, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 53 (1976).
84. For a timely corrective to the imperial pretensions of economics, see Cranston,
Creeping Economism: Some Thoughts on Law and Society, 4 BRIT. J.L. & ECON. 103
(1977); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV.
451 (1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product. A Buyer's
Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974).
85. See Pitofsky, note 57 supra; Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic
Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214
(1977).
86. See notes 2, 20, 21 supra.
87. See, ROWE, supra note 2, at 423-25.
88. See Banta & Field, supra note 21, at 89.
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their enthusiasm for the Act has not abated." The reason for this en-
forcement pattern has been the attempts by small businesses to com-
bine to solicit the same discriminatory advantages secured by their
chain store opponents." From an economist's point of view, the protec-
tion of small business against competition from the chain stores would
seem to be inconsistent with the general objective of promoting com-
petition as a whole, since the elimination of a small business may simply
be an incident of competition and reflect a more efficient market place,
assuming the departing business to be the least efficient performer.
Merely softening competition in favor of small business will
not overcome their relative disadvantages in such matters as availability
of capital, commercial and management expertise, and budgetary and
cost controls, but simply fosters inefficient enterprises with the conse-
quent misallocation of resources.
To some extent this inconsistency in antitrust objectives is over-
come by the Australian legislature's insistence in its price discrimina-
tion statute that only those discriminations which "substantially lessen
competition in a market for goods" are prohibited.' In focusing upon
anti-competitive discriminations only, the Australian statute92 also ef-
fectively distinguishes between the unobjectionable sporadic forms of
discrimination as opposed to the systematic forms which are likely to
produce anti-competitive harm. Further emphasis is given to this selec-
tion by the fact that the Australian statute expressly proscribes
discriminations which are of a "recurring or systematic character,"93
although it also proscribes a single discrimination "of such magnitude"
that it is likely also to have an impact upon competition.
An alternative to the Australo-American approach of prohibiting
price discriminations which have proscribed effects is to prohibit those
89. See Report of the Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman
Act and Related Matters (1976) reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1738, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
107-08, 121 (1976).
90. See J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION (1935); Fulda, Food Distribu-
tion in the United States, The Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L.
REv. 1051 (1951); Kintner, Romano & Filippini, Cooperative Buying and Antitrust Policy:
The Search for Competitive Equality, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 971 (1973); Mezings, Group
Buying- When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman Act? 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 729
(1969); Palmer, Buying Groups Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 CHI. KENT L. REV. 143
(1965).
91. Trade Practices Act 1974 § 49(1); see note 6 supra.
92. For a general discussion of Australian price discrimination law, see B. DONALD &
J. HEYDON, 1 TRADE PRACTICES LAW ch. 8 (1978); G. TAPERELL, R. VERMEESCH & D.
HARLAND, TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ch. 9 (2d ed. 1978); Mnookin, An
American Lawyer's View of Section 49 of the Trade Practices Act, 1 U.N.S.W.L.J. 121
(1975).
93. See note 85 supra.
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discriminatory activities which have prohibited purposes. Thus, for ex-
ample, discriminations which have the purpose of eliminating com-
petitors or competition could be prohibited. This approach has formed
the basis of various suggestions for a predatory pricing statute. 4 Given
the invariable difficulties of proving a prohibited purpose, economic
analysis would suggest that the relevant purpose be inferred from
systematic conduct.
A less extreme approach than this is contained in the Canadian
Combines Investigation Act95 which in section 34 imposes criminal
liability upon "[elvery one engaged in business who . . .is a party or
privy to, or assists in, any sale that discriminates to his knowledge.. .. "'
As a general model for emulation, the Canadian statute is defective in
that it is unconcerned with the impact of the relevant discriminations
upon competition.9"
The approach adopted in France and West Germany is to eschew
considerations of effect or purpose and to focus on conduct. Both Arti-
cle 37 of the French Prices Ordinance 9 and section 26(3) of the West
94. See, e.g., Campbell & Emanuel, A Proposal for a Revised Price Discrimination
and Predatory Pricing Statute, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 125 (1975); Elias, Robinson-Patman:
Time for Rechiseling, 26 MERCER L. REV. 689 (1975).
95. S.C., 1935, c. 56, s. 9 re-enacted 1953-54, c. 51, s. 412; transferred by s.c., 1960,
c.45 (currently codified at CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23, § 34 (1970)).
96. Section 34 provides:
(1) Every one engaged in a business who (a) is a party or privy to, or assists in, any
sale that discriminates to his knowledge, directly or indirectly, against competitors
of a purchaser of articles from him in that any discount, rebate, allowance, price
concession or other advantage is granted to the purchaser over and above any dis-
count, rebate, allowance, price concession or other advantage that, at the time the
articles are sold to such purchaser, is available to such competitors in respect of a
sale of articles of like quality and quantity;
is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23, § 34 (1970).
97. For a general discussion of the Canadian position, see Nozick, The Regulation of
Price Discrimination Under the Combines Investigation Act, 54 CAN. B. REV. 309 (1976).
98. Price Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945, art. 37 provides:
It shall be deemed to be an illegal practice in connection with prices:
(1) for any producer, trader, person engaged in industry, or craftsman
(a) to refuse to supply to the best of his ability and upon the customary trade
terms any request for the purchase of goods or the performance of ser-
vices which has no abnormal character and is made in good faith, and pro-
vided that the sale of such goods or the performance of such services is
not forbidden by law or government regulation, or habitually to
apply discriminatory conditions of sale or discriminatory price increases
which are not warranted by an equivalent increase in the cost of pro-
duction or the cost of performing the service ....
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German Act Against Restraints of Competition99 detail the conduct
which they deem to constitute illegal discriminatory practices. The two
statutes share with the Robinson-Patman Act the "folly" inherent "in
attempting to define sin in detail,"1 10 in that the inevitable drafting
complexities create more problems than they solve. 0 '
It was suggested above that one of the preconditions for systematic
price discrimination was the possession by the discriminator of a
degree of market power which could be used as a basis of underwriting
predatory assault in another market.1"2 This suggestion forms the basis
of the prohibition of price discrimination by Article 86(c) of the Treaty
of Rome,' the constitutive document of the E.E.C.,0 ' which prohibits
discriminations" 5 involving the abuse of a position of market
dominance. 0 6
A final approach is, of course, to assimilate each of the regulatory
techniques suggested by the various national legislatures to prohibit
discriminatory conduct having the purpose or effect of substantially
99. Section 26(2) of the Act provides:
Market dominating enterprises, associations of enterprises ...and enterprises
fixing prices . . . shall not hinder, directly or indirectly, another enterprise in
business activities which are usually open to similar enterprises, nor in the absence
of facts justifying such discrimination, treat such enterprise, directly or indirectly
in a manner different from the treatment accorded similar enterprises.
100. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 468 (2d ed.
1970).
101. For criticism of the textual anfractuosities of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
Adelman, The Inconsistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1953);
Austern, Difficult and Diffusive Decades: An Historical Plaint About the Robinson-
Patman Act, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 897 (1966); Note, Eine Kleine Juristische Schlum-
mergeschichte, 79 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1966).
102. See Cassady, Some Economic Aspects of Price-Discrimination under Non-Perfect
Market Conditions, 11 J. MKT. 7, 15 (1946).
103. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse
may, in particular, consist in:
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
104. See note 12 supra.
105. See generally van Hecke, The Prohibition Against Discrimination in the Euro-
pean Economic Community Treaty, in CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW 340 (1960)
(reports presented to the International Conference on Restraints of Competition at
Frankfurt am Main).
106. For a definition of market dominance under the Treaty of Rome, see the
authorities cited in Korah, Interpretation and Application of Article 86 of the Treaty of




lessening competition, which conduct involves an abuse of a position of
market power. In this way, it is probable that the objectionable
systematic forms of price discrimination will be eliminated while the
unobjectionable, or even pro-competitive, discriminatory practices will
be preserved. The "instruments" which come closest to this position
are found in the competition guidelines formulated by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development' ° for multi-national enter-
prises. Guideline 1 declares that enterprises should
I. refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition
in the relevant market by abusing a dominant position of market
power, by means of, for example,
(e) discriminatory (i.e., unreasonably differentiated) pricing and
using such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises as a
means of adversely affecting competition outside these enter-
prises .... "I
The limited applicability of subsection (e) is apparent from the clear
wording of the specific competition guideline; it denounces only
"unreasonably differentiated" pricing, not all instances in which dif-
ferent prices are exacted from purchasers in one or more nations.
Moreover, the scope of the prohibition extends only to the seller in a
dominant position in a particular market and only to discriminatory
pricing which would adversely affect competition in that market. The
specific guideline incorporates two important considerations with
which this article has been concerned: the distinction between
systematic and transient price differences and the scholarly criticism
of such anti-discrimination statutes as the Robinson-Patman Act on the
basis of their restriction on competitive pricing. The guideline culls
from price differences in general only those which are attributable to
the kind of systematic discrimination which is abusive of market power
and anti-competitive in effect. As opposed to the simplistic approach to
price discrimination which characterizes the failings of the Robinson-
Patman Act, in that it inclines the market structure towards uniform
pricing, the guideline allows for sufficient flexibility in pricing to
reflect the natural fluctuations within a competitive market. Therefore,
while the Robinson-Patman Act has served as a model for a number of
price discrimination statutes,' the lessons learned from its inade-
quacies may be more valuable in the refinement of the pro-competitive
objectives of such statutes.
107. See note 15 supra.
108. OECD Doc. 21(76) 0411 (1976), discussed in Davidow, Some Reflections on the
OECD Competition Guidelines, 22 ANTrrRUST BULL. 441, 445-46 (1977),
109. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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